

JAMES HERNÁNDEZ MCINTYRE

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EDUCATION

Rutgers University	Expected October 2026
Ph.D. in Philosophy	(all requirements completed)
<i>Parsimony's Place in Philosophy</i>	
Juan Comesaña (co-chair), Ernest Sosa (co-chair), Jill North, and Matthew McGrath (external)	
Pomona College	2019
B.A. in Philosophy, <i>cum laude</i> , Phi Beta Kappa	

AREAS

Specialization: Epistemology, AI, social and political philosophy
Competence: metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science

PUBLICATIONS († = invited; all others refereed)

Parsimony and Overfitting	Forthcoming
<i>Philosophy of Science</i>	
Consciousness Multiplied	2026
<i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , advance online publication	
Indoctrination and Democratic Legitimacy	2026
<i>Philosophy & Public Affairs</i> , advance online publication	
Reply to Bozenhard: Why Creators Cannot Win†	2026
<i>Philosophy & Technology</i> , 39, 109	
Skepticism and Ontological Parsimony	2026
<i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 107(2), 86-98	
Individuating Artificial Minds	2026
<i>Erkenntnis</i> , advance online publication	
Brute Fact Parsimony	2026
<i>Philosophical Studies</i> , advance online publication	
The Right to Restrict AI Training	2026
<i>Philosophy & Technology</i> , 39, 25	
Conceptual Misinformation	2025
<i>Synthese</i> , 206(4), 175	

PAPERS IN PROGRESS

A paper about conspiracy theories	Under Review
A paper about AI companions	Under Review
A paper about parsimony	Under Review
A paper about pragmatic encroachment	Under Review

PRESENTATIONS & COMMENTS (* = invited; all others refereed)

Presentations

<i>Updating AI Companions</i>	2026
6th Upstate Workshop on AI and Human Values, University of Rochester	
<i>The Right to Restrict AI Training</i>	2025
6th Biannual Conference on the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, VU Amsterdam	
<i>Individuating Artificial Minds</i>	2025
5th International Conference on Philosophy of Mind, University of Porto	
<i>Consciousness Multiplied</i>	2025
Society for Philosophy and Neuroscience, Washington University in St. Louis	
<i>Brute Fact Parsimony*</i>	2025
PDX Phil Sci Now, Reed College	
<i>Skepticism and Ontological Parsimony</i>	2025
Society for Skeptical Studies, APA Eastern Division	
<i>Epistemically Sharpening Occam's Razor</i>	2024
8th Panhellenic Conference on Philosophy of Science, University of Athens	
<i>Efficient Information Storage as an Epistemic Norm</i>	2024
MINT-Yale Workshop of Normative Philosophy of Computing, Yale University	
<i>Indoctrination as a Political Strategy</i>	2024
MANCEPT, University of Manchester	
<i>What is Indoctrination?</i>	2024
Colloquium, APA Central Division	

Comments*

Sophia Arbeiter, "Moore's Paradox Generalized," APA Eastern Division	2024
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TEACHING

Teaching Assistant

Human Nature and Human Diversity with Jake Quilty-Dunn	Spring 2026
Introduction to Cognitive Science with Shannon Bryant	Fall 2025
Human Nature and Human Diversity with Jake Quilty-Dunn	Spring 2024
Introduction to Philosophy (writing intensive) with Stephen Stich	Fall 2023
Introduction to Philosophy (writing intensive) with Stephen Stich	Fall 2021

Grader

Philosophical Aspects of Cognitive Science with Jake Quilty-Dunn	Fall 2024
Introduction to Philosophy with Richard Fry	Fall 2019

COURSEWORK

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind

Seminar in Epistemology (Ernest Sosa & Thomas Kelly)	Spring 2022
Advanced Topics in Epistemology (Ernest Sosa & Matthew McGrath)	Spring 2021

Metaphysics of Mind (Karen Bennett & Jonathan Schaffer)	Spring 2021
Conceptualizing the World (David Chalmers & Michael Strevens at NYU)	Fall 2021
Advanced Topics in Epistemology (Ernest Sosa & Matthew McGrath)	Fall 2019
Philosophy of Science	
Topics in Philosophy of Science (Brad Weslake at NYU)	Fall 2020
Biological Essentialism (Michel Devitt at CUNY)	Fall 2020
Value Theory	
Aesthetics (Robert Hopkins & Anja Jauernig at NYU)	Fall 2021
Social and Political Philosophy (Alexander Guerrero)	Spring 2020
Advanced Topics in Ethics (Larry Temkin)	Fall 2019
History of Philosophy	
Philosophy of Perception and Religious Experience (Dean Zimmerman)	Fall 2022
Seminar in Medieval Philosophy (Brian Leftow)	Spring 2020
Seminar in Aristotle (Robert Bolton)	Fall 2020
Other	
Topics in Logic (Anthony Gillies)	Spring 2020
Proseminar (Jeffrey King)	Fall 2019

SERVICE

Referee

AI and Ethics (2x), *Synthese* (2x), *Erkenntnis*, *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Studies*

Volunteer Judge

2026

New Jersey High School Ethics Bowl

Colloquium Committee

2024-2025

Member, Rutgers University

Graduate Student Assistant

2022-2023

Organizer for “Perceiving Divine Presences” Research Grant

Editorial Manager

2021-2022

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Minorities and Philosophy

2020-2022

Co-coordinator, Rutgers University

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Empirical evidence underdetermines theory—doubly so in philosophy, where such evidence is marginal. To adjudicate between empirically adequate theories, we must turn to the non-empirical virtues, with parsimony chief among them. Yet parsimony’s epistemic credentials are precarious: why think that simpler theories are more likely to be true? My dissertation aims to answer this question and clarify parsimony’s role in epistemology more generally.

I argue that we are justified in *prima facie* disbelieving theories that posit undetectable entities, with important implications for epistemology more broadly. Because the skeptic denies that our faculties can support justified beliefs about the external world, they deny the possibility of acquiring undefeated evidence that it exists. In other words, by their lights, the external world is undetectable. Thus, appropriately supplemented with an anti-undetectability principle, the skeptical challenge intensifies into something far

more radical: outright *denial* that the external world or its constituents, as we commonly conceive of them, exist. This poses problems for concessive responses to skepticism, such as entitlement-based and pragmatic strategies.

The anti-undetectability principle can be brought to bear on the epistemology of conspiracy theories. Because conspiracy theories posit secret activities, they necessarily postulate hidden evidence. While not entirely undetectable, hidden evidence is highly so. If theories positing perfectly undetectable entities are to be *prima facie* disbelieved, presumably positing highly undetectable entities should likewise incur some lesser epistemic penalty. This allows us to explain what makes conspiracy theories intrinsically epistemically suspicious without unduly implying that belief in a conspiracy theory could never be justified.

The dissertation then turns to more general questions of parsimony, beyond undetectability. I argue that parsimony's use in philosophy cannot be defended based on an analogy to science, because science invokes parsimony under conditions of noisy evidence that are not present in philosophy. Next, I argue that ontological parsimony, in the first instance, ranges over fundamental ontology. The key observation: ontological and ideological commitments can be traded without loss of explanatory power. It follows that with respect to parsimony, they must be treated analogously. Finally, I reduce both forms of parsimony to a single, more foundational virtue: brute fact parsimony.